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Noise and the Law: A Survey
Joseph L. Cohen*
Leonard Sharon**
The subject of noise and the law has received extensive comment
recently as a consequence of a more general concern with environmen-
tal protection. Although a certain amount of redundancy, therefore,
cannot be avoided in treating this subject, the purpose of this article
is to set forth the state of the law with respect to problems of noise.
Consideration will first be given to the private remedies available to
persons whose personal or property rights are adversely affected by
noise. Secondly, the law of public nuisance will be explored as a transi-
tional concept from private remedy to public regulation. The various
types of public regulation will then be discussed. Finally, certain con-
clusions about the manner in which the law seeks to deal with problems
of noise and the direction of prospective legislation and programs of
noise control will be made.
I. PRIVATE LEGAL REMEDIES
A. Private Nuisance
Private nuisance, as opposed to public nuisance, is an unreasonable
interference with a person's right to the use and enjoyment of his
property.' Such a nuisance exists when the interference is substantial,
results in damage, and is caused by the use of the actor's property which
the law deems unreasonable. 2 That noise may constitute a private nui-
sance has never been open to serious question.8
When noise constitutes a private nuisance, the remedies available to
the plaintiff are those generally available in private nuisance actions.
Thus, the plaintiff in a common law action may obtain compensatory
damages for a nuisance caused by noise, and in an appropriate case,
* B.A., Temple University, 1946; M.A., Columbia University, 1948; LL.B., Yale Uni-
versity, 1951; Associate Professor, Graduate School of Public Health, University of Pitts-
burgh.
** B.A., University of Pittsburgh, 1967, J.D., 1970. The research for this article was
funded by a United States Public Health Services Training Grant.
1. W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 89 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
2. Id.
3. Lloyd, Noise as a Nuisance, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 567 (1933).
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punitive damages.4 Injunctive relief is also available as in other cases
of private nuisance. 5
Inasmuch as a private nuisance is defined as an unreasonable inter-
ference with a person's right to the use and enjoyment of his property,
the plaintiff in a private nuisance action must have such an interest in
property as will entitle him to its use and enjoyment. In Wilson v.
Parent,6 it was held that a dower interest, not entitling the person to a
present interest in the use and enjoyment of property, will not support
a nuisance action.7 Moreover, a party may not maintain a nuisance ac-
tion to protect another's interest in real estate. Thus, a tenant may not
maintain a nuisance action to protect a reversionary interest.8
If the activity of a defendant is not the legal cause of the invasion of
plaintiff's interest, no liability will attach to defendant's conduct. In
Molony v. Pounds,9 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the grant
of an injunction by the court below that prohibited defendants from
operating their twenty-four hour restaurant between the hours of one
a.m. and six a.m. because the appellate court found the defendants
were not legally responsible for the alleged nuisance. The plaintiff in
Molony objected to the noise outside the restaurant from patrons
talking, slamming automobile doors, and blowing horns intermittently.
The operation of the restaurant itself, however, was not the cause of
the complaint. The court held that the defendants were in no way
responsible for the conduct of their patrons either before they entered
or after they left the restaurant premises.
The crux of any private nuisance action consists in the balancing of
the gravity of a harm done to plaintiff's interests against the reasonable-
ness of defendant's use of his own property. This balancing process to
determine initially whether a private nuisance exists should not be
confused with that balancing process in a court of equity to determine
whether an injunction should be issued to restrain a nuisance. The
initial balancing process is to determine the very essence of the nui-
4. Gorman v. Sabo, 210 Md. 155, 122 A.2d 475 (1956).
5. Nair v. Thaw, 156 Conn. 445, 242 A.2d 757 (1968); Wheat Calvert Co. v. Jenkins, 240
Ky. 319, 55 S.W.2d 4 (1932); Kobielski v. Belle Isle East Side Creamery Co., 222 Mich. 656,
193 N.W. 214 (1923); Anderson v. Guerrein Sky-Way Amusement Co., 346 Pa. 80, 29 A.2d
682 (1943); Quinn v. American Spiral Spring & Mfg. Co., 293 Pa. 152, 141 A. 855 (1928).
6. 228 Ore. 354, 365 P.2d 72 (1961).
7. See also RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 822 (1938); PROSSER, supra note 1 (a plaintiff may
maintain a private nuisance action only to protect his property interest).
8. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 593.
9. 361 Pa. 498, 64 A.2d 802 (1949).
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sance itself; the second of these processes determines whether an in-
junction will lie.10
It is difficult to determine in advance what constitutes a substantial
interference with a person's right to the use and enjoyment of his
property in the case of noise. As W. H. Lloyd has said:
. . for it is generally admitted that noise alone may constitute a
nuisance, although in determining whether it is in fact such a nui-
sance as to entitle the complaining party to relief at law or in
equity, volume, time, place and duration of its occurrence, as well
as the locality, must be taken into consideration."
In order to determine whether the interference is substantial, it is
not enough that the noise affects someone with highly idiosyncratic
responses to noise. As Prosser has indicated:
Where the invasion affects the physical condition of plaintiff's
land, the substantial character of the interference is seldom in
doubt. But where it involves mere personal discomfort or annoy-
ance, some other standard must obviously be adopted than the
personal tastes, susceptibilities and idiosyncracies of the particu-
lar plaintiff. The standard must necessarily be that of definite offen-
siveness, inconvenience or annoyance to the normal person in the
community .... 12
The following cases are merely illustrative of what have been con-
sidered to be unreasonable interferences with one's right to the use
and enjoyment of his land, and do not exhaust the possibilities as to
what type of sound may be considered a nuisance. In Keenly v. Mc-
Carty,13 cries and screams of patients in a private hospital for alcoholics
and drug addicts were held to constitute a nuisance. Noises from a
creamery during a period from midnight to eight in the morning have
been held a substantial interference where loud and profane talk-
ing was combined with the clamor of milk wagons and cans.' 4 Like-
wise, noises emanating from a plant during sleeping hours were held to
be a substantial interference in Wheat Calvert Co. v. Jenkins.15 What
may be one man's music may be another's nuisance. Thus, in Lambton
10. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1.30 (1956) [hereinafter
cited as HARPER & JAMES].
11. Lloyd, supra note 3, at 569.
12. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 578.
13. 137 Misc. 524, 244 N.Y.S. 63 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
14. Kobielski v. Belle Isle East Side Creamery Co., 222 Mich. 656, 193 N.W. 214 (1923).
15. 240 Ky. 319, 55 S.W.2d 4 (1932).
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v. Mellish, 6 the sound of an organ which could be heard for over a
mile was held to be substantial interference with the use and enjoy-
ment of the plaintiff's land.
The reasonableness of the defendant's use of his property is an ele-
ment in determining whether, in light of the gravity of plaintiff's harm,
a nuisance exists. As the court in Molony v. Pounds,"7 indicated:
At the time of the hearing, appellants' restaurant was the only all-
night restaurant in Conshohocken, and practically all its patrons
are local people. During the day its customers include business-
men, school teachers, clergymen and office workers. Many of its
night patrons are workmen employed by industries in and about
Conshohocken which operate on a twenty-four hour schedule, and
some .of these industries maintain charge accounts at the restaurant
for the accommodation of their employees. No intoxicating bever-
ages are sold and there is no musical or other noise-making enter-
tainment device on the premises. The noises subject of complaint,
and on which the suspension of appellants' business was based,
arise wholly outside the restaurant, from loud talking by people
entering or leaving, and from the slamming of automobile doors
and blowing of horns. There is no evidence that appellants have
encouraged or abetted such noises in any manner. Moreover, the
unavoidable inference from the evidence is that these noises do
not occur regularly, but are only occasionally heard."'
That the defendant's conduct has social utility has not always inured
to his benefit. It is only one element in the complex of factors that de-
termine the existence of a nuisance. Neither does the fact that defen-
dant is operating a manufacturing establishment in an area zoned
"industrial" confer upon the defendant the right to create a nuisance.
In Quinn v. American Spiral Spring & Manufacturing Co.,1 9 the court
reversed the dismissal by the lower court of a bill in equity brought to
restrain the operation of a plant manufacturing iron and steel springs
because of the great noise and racket it produced. Prior to building
the establishment on the property adjacent to plaintiff's, the defendant
endeavored to purchase plaintiff's property. Plaintiff, however, did not
wish to sell at the price offered by defendant. The court found that
16. 3 Ch. D. 163 (1894).
17. 361 Pa. 498, 64 A.2d 802 (1949).
18. Id. at 503, 64 A.2d at 804.
19. 293 Pa. 152, 141 A. 855 (1928). But see Wojnar v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 348 Pa.
595, 36 A.2d 321 (1944) (person living in an area zoned "Industrial" only had the right to
that degree of quietness consistent with the standard of comfort prevailing in the locality
in which he dwells).
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since the plaintiff lived in an industrial zone that did not give the
defendant the right to maintain a nuisance. Further, the court found
that the defendant had built the plant creating the noise on that portion
of his property which was closest to plaintiff's dwelling, although it
had the option of placing the plant on another part of its property
where it would not constitute a nuisance to plaintiff. In reversing the
court below, which dismissed plaintiff's bill in equity, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court instructed the lower court as follows:
On a careful consideration of the whole case, we are of opinion
that defendants should be required, within such reasonable time
as the court below shall direct, to so relocate and install their
heavy machinery, as to cause a minimum of injury to plaintiff and
his property, consistent with a reasonable operation of the plant;
that, if they do not do so within the time specified, they should be
enjoined from operating the machinery until they do; and that
they should be required to pay to plaintiff such damages as will
recompense him for the injuries he has sustained from the im-
proper location and use of the heavy machinery. For the proper
determination of these matters, leave is given to produce further
evidence, if desired by the court or either party.
20
That a defendant is conducting a lawful business is not a sufficient
defense, in itself, against a nuisance suit.21
A frequent element in noise nuisance cases is the time the noise
occurs. Where noise during normal working hours may not be a nui-
sance, the same noise during sleeping hours may create a nuisance.22
In those cases in which relief has been denied the plaintiff, it has
sometimes been found that the alleged nuisance created by noise did
not exist. Thus, in Grzelka v. Chevrolet Motor Car Co., 23 the court up-
held a jury verdict for the defendant in a case in which plaintiff alleged
injury to premises caused by vibrations from large hammers and inter-
ference with the enjoyment of his property. The defendant in this case
was located in a large industrial area. And, in Pawlowicz v. American
Locomotive Co.,24 where plaintiffs sought an injunction against the op-
eration of a drop-forge plant and damages for injury to property al-
20. 293 Pa. at 161, 141 A.2d at 858.
21. Dixon v. New York Trap Rock Corp., 293 N.Y. 509, 58 N.E.2d 517 (1944); Kroker v.
Westmoreland Painting Mill Co., 274 Pa. 143, 117 A. 914 (1922).
22. Nair v. Thaw, 156 Conn. 445, 242 A.2d 757 (1968); Wheat Calvert Co. v. Jenkins,
240 Ky. 319, 55 S.W.2d 4 (1932); Kobielski v. Belle Isle East Side Creamery Co., 222 Mich.
656, 193 N.W. 214 (1923).
23. 286 Mich. 141, 281 N.W. 568 (1938).
24. 90 Misc. 450, 154 N.Y.S. 768 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
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legedly caused by the jar of the plant, relief was denied because the
noise was characterized as slight and the vibrations of the plant were
found not to be the cause of the property damage.
Noise may have legal significance in landlord and tenant relation-
ships. In Ben Har Holding Corp. v. Fox,25 the court found that the
chirping of crickets within the plaintiff's apartment was not such a
serious interference with plaintiff's right to use and enjoy his leasehold
as to constitute a constructive eviction. But in Barnard Realty Co. v.
Bonwit,26 continuous noise from rats within the walls of a house was
held to be a constructive eviction. And in Bonan v. Sarni Original Dry
Cleaners, Inc.,27 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed
the action of the trial court in refusing to grant an injunction to the
owner of a shopping center against its tenant who operated a dryclean-
ing establishment. The plaintiff alleged that, contrary to the provisions
of the lease, the defendant operated the drycleaning establishment in
an offensive and noisy manner. The evidence produced at trial, how-
ever, not only failed to substantiate the allegations of the plaintiff,
but tended to show that whatever noise was being produced was due
to multiple causes which could not be distinguished. There also ap-
peared to be a good faith attempt on the part of the defendant to re-
duce the noise levels emanating from the drycleaning establishment by
the installation of new equipment designed to reduce noise levels sub-
stantially.
Clearly, where defendant produces noise with the intent to annoy
his neighbors, such noise is both intentional and unreasonable. There-
fore, it lacks social utility.2 8
B. Injunctive Relief
Injunctive relief is sought in many noise nuisance cases since it offers
a means of direct abatement of the problem and offers great flexibility.
While in some cases injunctive relief was granted against a total opera-
tion, in the majority of cases the relief was fashioned to the measure
of the annoyance or, to paraphrase Gilbert and Sullivan, "The remedy
was made to fit the wrong."
In cases where noise disturbed residents during their normal sleep-
25. 147 Misc. 300, 263 N.Y.S. 695 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. 1933).
26. 155 App. Div. 182, 139 N.Y.S. 1050 (1913).
27. 268 N.E.2d 366 (Mass. 1971).
28. Collier v. Ernst, 46 Pa. D. & C. 1 (C.P. Del. Co. 1942).
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ing hours, injunctions have been granted more or less frequently
against operations causing noises at that time. In Nair v. Thaw,2 an
injunction was granted against the operation of a noisy air-conditioner
between ten p.m. and eight a.m. until the sound volume was reduced
to a certain decibel level. Thus, defendants were given the opportunity
of finding a way to reduce the objectionable noise.
Similarly, in Kobielski v. Belle Isle East Side Creamery Co.,30 and in
Wheat Calvert Co. v. Jenkins,31 injunctions were granted to restrain
the noise only during normal sleeping hours. In Davis v. Levin,3 2 how-
ever, an injunction against the operation of an air-conditioner was re-
fused in circumstances similar to that of Nair.
Sometimes an injunction will be granted against the total operation
of a business, if that is the only method by which the nuisance can be
avoided.33 At other times a court of equity will enter a decree giving a
defendant the choice of rectifying the situation or refraining totally
from the conduct producing the nuisance. In Quinn v. American Spiral
Spring & Manufacturing Co.,3 4 the court afforded the defendant a
choice within a given time period. Likewise, in Anderson v. Guerrein
Sky-Way Amusement Co.,3 5 an injunction was granted only after the
court had granted defendant sufficient time to abate the noise problem
and defendant had failed to comply.
In Assembly of God Church of Tahoka v. Bradley,386 an injunction
was sought and granted to restrain the construction of a church on the
ground that it would be so operated as to constitute a nuisance. Gen-
erally, before the construction of a building which is not a nuisance
per se will be enjoined, it must appear that the use of the building will
necessarily create a nuisance. The court in Bradley, however, was in-
fluenced because the defendant church had previously conducted its
services in a nearby tent and disturbed property owners in the vicinity
The flexibility of a court of equity to fashion a remedy to fit the cir-
cumstances is illustrated in Collier v. Ernst8 7 In that case the court's
decree had the following provisions:
29. 156 Conn. 445, 242 A.2d 757 (1968).
30. 222 Mich. 656, 193 N.W. 214 (1923).
31. 240 Ky. 319, 55 S.W.2d 4 (1932).
32. 138 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1962).
33. Thompson v. Hodge, 348 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1961).
34. 293 Pa. 152, 141 A. 855 (1928).
35. 346 Pa. 80, 29 A.2d 682 (1943).
36. 196 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
37. 46 Pa. D. & C. 1 (C.P. Del. Co. 1942).
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(1) No marimba playing between the hours of 1 P.M. and 10
P.M. on Sundays, and 9 A.M. to 10 P.M. on weekdays;
(2) Marimba could not be played for a total of more than three
hours per day, and more than one hour at a time;
(3) Loud playing of the marimba was prohibited; and
(4) The defendant was enjoined from playing certain offensive
tunes characterizing certain neighbors with an intent to an-
noy them.38
While airplane noise problems present many legal ramifications that
will be dealt with elsewhere in this article, three cases are of interest from
the viewpoint of injunctive relief. In Maitland v. Twin City Aviation
Corp.,39 plaintiffs sought damages and injunctive relief against defen-
dants to prevent aircraft from flying low over plaintiff's property. Dam-
ages in this case were sought for injury to plaintiff's mink farm. The
court held that in addition to damages for injury to plaintiff's busi-
ness, plaintiff was entitled to an injunction restraining defendant from
permitting low flying aircraft over plaintiff's property as the take-offs
and landings from defendant's airport were in violation of Civil Aero-
nautics Administration regulations.
In Antonik v. Chamberlain,40 however, the court refused to grant
an injunction to restrain defendants from using their property as a
privately owned airport. The injunction was denied because plaintiffs
failed to show a prediction of great and irreparable injury. The only
showing in the case was the inconvenience that would be suffered by
residential property owners in the vicinity of existing airports. Although
an injunction is available to restrain a potential nuisance, apparently
the court in this case was of the opinion that a nuisance in the legal
sense was not likely to develop from the operation of the airport.
Except where flights are made in violation of Civil Aeronautics
Administration regulations, it is doubtful whether an injunction would
ever lie at the instance of a private party to restrain the operations of a
public airport. Air transportation is sanctioned by Congress and is the
subject of a vast scheme of regulation and promotion, including the
acquisition of land for publicly operated airports. This precludes the
issuance of an injunction under such circumstances.41
While a private landowner might not be entitled to injunctive relief
38. Id. at 10.
39. 254 Wis. 541, 37 N.W.2d 74 (1949).
40. 81 Ohio App. 465, 78 N.E.2d 752 (1947).
41. East Haven v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 338 (D. Conn. 1971).
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against the operation of an airport, nevertheless, an airport owner,
especially a publicly operated one, may be entitled to an injunction
against aircraft utilizing its facilities where the aircraft does not con-
form to the rules and regulations of the airport management. 42
In Port of New York Authority v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,43 the court
held that it was not necessary that the Port Authority show irreparable
damage or loss to be entitled to injunctive relief. Applying New York
law, the federal district court treated the agreement of the airlines
with the Port Authority as being in the nature of a lease. Thus, as the
landowner, the Pbrt Authority, was entitled to an injunction merely
on the ground that the tenant violated a covenant in the lease.
C. Damages
Where damages are sought for noise nuisances, the measure of dam-
ages depends upon the extent of the injury and the kind of injury in-
volved.
In Dixon v. New York Trap Rock Corp.,44 plaintiffs were awarded
$750 damages for injury to their property, and $2000 in damages for
"deterioration of health" due to discomfort and inconvenience caused
by disturbance of plaintiffs' right to the enjoyment of their property.
Likewise, in Nair, plaintiff was awarded $3500 in damages for physical
discomfort and annoyance caused by defendants' unreasonable use of
their air-conditioning unit. These damages were awarded to plaintiff for
the interference with the "comfortable" use and enjoyment of her prop-
erty. And in Gorman v. Sabo,45 plaintiffs were awarded $3500 for inter-
ference by defendant with their right to the use and enjoyment of their
property. Defendant, in Gorman, intentionally and maliciously harassed
plaintiffs with loud noises.
Where a court grants injunctive relief in addition to damages, the
damages will be compensation for past injury, and not punitive or exem-
plary.46 Moreover, where a court grants an injunction, it may not grant
damages contingent on the defendant's noncompliance with the injunc-
tion. In Thompson v. Hodge,47 the court upheld the granting of an in-
42. Port of N.Y. Authority v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 745 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
43. Id.
44. 293 N.Y. 509, 58 N.E.2d 517 (1944).
45. 210 Md. 155, 122 A.2d 475 (1956).
46. Nair v. Thaw, 156 Conn. 445, 242 A.2d 757 (1968).
47. 348 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1961).
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junction but reversed the award of $1000 damages for noncompliance
with the injunction. The court characterized such damages as punitive
in nature and not allowable in an equitable proceeding.
When a court of equity takes jurisdiction over a nuisance action for
the purpose of determining whether it should grant equitable relief,
it may also grant damages in an appropriate case.48 There is a split of
opinion, however, as to whether a court of equity may award damages
in the absence of granting equitable relief.49 The award of damages
without the grant of equitable relief would seem to imply the existence
in a particular case of an adequate remedy at law. Traditionally, equity
lacks jurisdiction where the remedy at law is adequate.
Punitive damages are available in nuisance cases, and have been
awarded in nuisance cases involving noise.50 As has been noted above,
however, a court of equity is without power to grant punitive or exem-
plary damages.51 The theory is that the grant of an injunction will be
sufficient deterrence to defendants and others who may have similar
acts in mind. Thus, equitable relief will have the same function as the
award of punitive or exemplary damages would have in a common
law nuisance case.
D. Aircraft Noise
Since most airports in the United States are owned and operated by
governmental agencies, the problem of aircraft noise in and around
such airports is elevated to the status of a constitutional problem. Un-
der the fifth amendment of the Federal Constitution and like provisions
of the constitutions of several states, private property may not be taken
for a public use without the payment of just compensation to the prop-
erty owner. Whether it be the construction of highways, bridges, public
buildings, or airports, the owners of that property taken for the partic-
ular public use involved, have a constitutional right to just compensa-
tion. Ordinarily, there is no dispute regarding whether private property
is taken in the constitutional 'sense; most disputes arise over the
value of the property. If a dispute arises as to whether property is taken,
this dispute must be settled before damages can be ascertained.
48. 25 C.J.S. Damages § 117 (1966); 30 C.J.S. Equity § 72 (1965); 43 C.J.S, Injunction
§ 217 (1945); 66 C.J.S. Nuisance § 121 (1950).
49. Gorman v. Sabo, 210 Md. 155, 122 A.2d 475 (1956).
50. Id.
51. It has been held that even in a common law action for nuisance where damages have
been awarded for a temporary nuisance, the defendant is under an obligation to abate
the nuisance. Ganster v. Metropolitan Elec. Co., 214 Pa. 628, 64 A. 91 (1906).
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Disputes of this nature most often arise in communities surrounding
public airports. They are occasioned by the adverse effects on private
property resulting from the operation of the airport, particularly noise
from the take-off and landing of jet aircraft. While the facilities of a
public airport may not encroach upon surrounding private property,
nevertheless, there may be a constitutional taking. If the airport opera-
tions produce objectionable noise and other inconvenience to surround-
ing property owners as to deprive them effectively of the beneficial use
of their land, then the law of "taking" comes into contact with the law
of trespass, nuisance, and air easements. 52
In Richards v. Washington Terminal Co.,5 the United States Su-
preme Court recognized that a governmental agency, or a private corpo-
ration endowed with the power of eminent domain, may create such a
private nuisance so as to render the use and enjoyment of one's prop-
erty valueless. Under such conditions, Richards recognized that a
nuisance of this magnitude would constitute a taking of private prop-
erty for which, constitutionally, just compensation would be required.54
While Richards did not involve airports or aircraft, it nevertheless
stated a principle that came to full fruition in the age of aircraft.
In United States v. Causby55 the Supreme Court of the United States
made authoritative pronouncements on constitutional law, ownership
rights of land, and Congressional power to regulate the airways, that
formed the basis of future developments in this area. The Court dis-
posed of the old common law doctrine that the owner of the surface
of real estate owned vertically to the heavens above and to the depths
below the earth.56 Declining to sanction such a doctrine in an age of
air transportation, the Court enunciated another rule; namely, that
with regard to the super-adjacent airspace above a person's land, that
person owns only so much of that airspace as he can use.57
Presumably, flights within such airspace would constitute a trespass
if the flights were not authorized by the owner of the surface. However,
flights above that limit over a person's property would not constitute
a trespass since the owner of the surface did not own the airspace above
this limit.
Causby concerned a chicken farmer and his wife whose farm was
52. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
53. 233 U.S. 546 (1914).
54. Id. at 553.
55. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
56. Id. at 260-61.
57. Id. at 264.
143
Duquesne Law Review
adjacent to an army air force base in North Carolina. Frequent flights
of army aircraft at extremely low altitudes over plaintiffs' land not only
caused much annoyance and fright to plaintiffs personally, such flights
also frightened the chickens causing them to run against the walls,
thereby killing themselves. Thus, the effect of the frequent flights of
military aircraft was to ruin plaintiffs' business.
Under the provisions of the Air Commerce Act58 prevailing at the
time Causby was decided, navigable airspace was defined in such a
manner so as to exclude from its definition the path of glide necessary
for take-offs and landing. In this circumstance the Court found that
the United States Government had, by the operation of the air force
base, taken a property right, in the nature of an easement, belonging
to plaintiffs for which just compensation must be made. Since the facts
of the case and some of the language of the Court suggested that there
was a trespass involved, subsequent court decisions, mostly in the fed-
eral courts, have sometimes insisted that the Supreme Court required
a trespass in these cases before a constitutional taking could exist. The
Court did recognize, however, that the nuisance caused by the low fly-
ing military aircraft was of such a nature as to deprive plaintiffs of the
beneficial use of their land.5 9 Thus, in Causby the concepts of taking
merged with those of trespass, nuisance, and easement.
In Batten v. United States,60 a divided court of appeals held that
under the Causby rationale there is no taking if the aircraft did not
invade the airspace of the property owner. The dissent voiced vigorous
objection to this interpretation of Causby. The rationale of the dissent
was followed in Thornburg v. Port of Portland.6' In that case there
were flights over plaintiff's land and flights adjacent to but not over plain-
tiff's land. The flights over the land were at such altitudes as not to be
invasions of plaintiff's property under the Causby rationale. Neverthe-
less, the court in Thornburg decided that the presence of a nuisance
that substantially deprived plaintiff of the use and enjoyment of her
property constituted a taking despite the absence of a trespass.
The question of what entity is liable to a landowner for a taking
caused by overflights of aircraft was decided by the United States
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Allegheny County.62 In that case, the Court
58. Act of May 20, 1926, ch. 344, §§ 1-14, 44 Stat. 568-76.
59. 328 U.S. at 258-59.
60. 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963).
61. 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).
62. 369 U.S. 84 (1962), rev'g 402 Pa. 411, 168 A.2d 123 (1961).
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held that the taking was by the governmental entity owning and operat-
ing the airport and not the federal government. The Court overruled
a decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that held that the
county which owned and operated the airport was not liable to plain-
tiffs for taking their property.
In Griggs, as in Causby, the flights over plaintiffs' land were ex-
tremely low, almost touching the rooftops. The provisions of the Air
Commerce Act6 were amended after Causby to provide that navigable
airspace includes the paths of glide necessary for landing and take-off.
An effort was made by defendants in Griggs to rely on this change in the
Act to claim that there could be no invasion of plaintiffs' airspace if the
planes were operating all the time within the navigable airspace as de-
fined by Congress. In response to this claim the United States Supreme
Court cited Causby for the principle that frequent flights of low flying
aircraft depriving the landowner of beneficial use of his property consti-
tute a taking under the Federal Constitution.
Other cases involving aircraft noise illustrate the various fact situa-
tions that arise, the claims advanced, and the manner of their deter-
mination. In Westchester Home Owners Association v. Los Angeles,"
the court held that where homeowners living near the Los Angeles
International Airport maintain a suit against the city as owner and
operator of the airport under either nuisance, negligence, or inverse
condemnation theories for the noise and air pollution caused by the
jet aircraft using the airport, the city may maintain a suit for subroga-
tion against the airlines using the airport and the manufacturers of the
aircraft.
In Maynard v. United States,65 a military aircraft flew low over an
area where plaintiff was riding a horse. The noise of the aircraft
frightened the horse causing the rider to be thrown and injured. In
denying plaintiff's claim for compensation under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, the court in Maynard held that the selection of the route
of the aircraft was an act in furtherance of governmental policy and
discretionary in nature, therefore, not actionable.
In City of Boston v. Massachusetts Port Authority,66 the plaintiff
claimed that the defendant port authority which operated Logan Airport
took property belonging to the city of Boston in violation of the city's
63. Act of May 20, 1926, ch. 344, §§ 1-14, 44 Stat. 568-76.
64. No. 931989 (L.A. Co., Cal. Super. Ct., April 17, 1970).
65. 430 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1971).
66. 444 F.2d 167 (lst Cir. 1971).
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fourteenth amendment rights since the noise of aircraft taking off and
landing at the airport substantially diminished the value of the city's
school property. The court of appeals affirmed a district court determi-
nation that the city did not state a claim for which the federal court
could grant relief. The court held that the city had no such due process
claim under the Federal Constitution.
In Kirk v. United States,67 landowners were held to have a contractual
claim against the United States under circumstances in which it ap-
peared that their properties were damaged by sonic boom tests made
by the Federal Aviation Administration, and where the Federal Aviation
Administration publicly assured people that it would pay for damages
done. The issue arose on whether the shorter statute of limitations
under the Federal Tort Claims Act barred the suit, or whether the suit
could be brought under the Tucker Act, relating to contractual claims
against the United States that has a longer statute of limitations.
II. PUBLIC NUISANCE
The principles of public nuisance provide a transition from private
legal remedies available in the field of noise to governmental regula-
.tion. Prosser has defined public nuisance in the following terms:
No better definition of a public nuisance has been suggested
than of an act or omission "which obstructs or causes inconvenience
or damage to the public in the exercise of rights common to all
Her Majesty's subjects." The term comprehends a miscellaneous
and diversified group of minor criminal offenses, based on some
interference with the interests of the community, or the comfort
or convenience of the general public. It includes interferences ...
with the public peace, as by loud and disturbing noises .... 68
The difference between a public and private nuisance is not in the
activity of the actor but in the nature of the interest with which there
is interference. As has been stated above, a private nuisance is an un-
reasonable interference with one's right to use and enjoy his property,
whereas a public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right
of the public. In the field of environmental insults, many activities,
for example the making of noise, production of smoke and offensive
67. 326 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Okla. 1970).
68. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 583-84.
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odors, and the pollution of the waters, may constitute both a public
and a private nuisance.
While a public nuisance is usually a species of minor criminal offense,
it also may be the basis of civil litigation-either on behalf of the state
or on behalf of a private party. Except where specifically authorized to
do so by statute, a private party may not maintain an action either at
law or in equity for a public nuisance unless the party alleges that he
suffers some special or particular damage as a result of the public
nuisance, or that the activity of the defendant also constitutes a private
nuisance insofar as plaintiff is concerned.619
Principles that were first enunciated in private nuisance cases have
been, because of the similarity in terminology, utilized as well in public
nuisance cases. Thus, in public nuisances, the interference must be a
substantial one-objectionable to the ordinary reasonable man.70 Also,
the balancing process of weighing the degree of harm caused by the
actor's conduct against its social utility is part of the public as well as
the private nuisance theory.71
The special injury which allows a private party to maintain a public
nuisance action need not be the result of conduct constituting the pub-
lic nuisance itself, but may be due to some incidental activity associated
with it. In Wittmer v. Fretti,72 plaintiff commenced an action in equity
against the operation of a gambling house seeking an injunction and
damages. The gambling house was situated approximately eight-tenths
of a mile from plaintiff's residence and the operation of the gambling
establishment was a public nuisance under state law. Plaintiff alleged
and proved, inter alia, that the persons who frequented the establishment
blew their automobile horns frequently and loudly to the disturbance
of the plaintiff. The court found this situation to be that type of special
injury which would support an action for public nuisance at the in-
stance of a private party. While the court refused the plaintiff's request
for damages on the basis that it deemed them too speculative, never-
theless, it granted the plaintiff the requested injunction. The court
noted that while private persons may not ordinarily resort to equity to
prevent criminal acts, they may do so if they suffer injury distinct from
that suffered by the public generally.
69. PROSSER, Private Action For Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997 (1966).
70. Id. at 1002.
71. Id. at 1003.
72. 95 Ohio App. 7, 116 N.E.2d 728 (1952).
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The distinction between a public and private nuisance is well illus-
trated in Wilson v. Parent.7 Wilson involved an equity action by plain-
tiff to restrain defendant, her son-in-law, from using foul and obscene
language and making obscene gestures toward her in public. In addition
to the family relationship, plaintiff and defendant were next door
neighbors. While the court denied plaintiff equitable relief,74 it noted
the distinction between private and public nuisance and the requisites
for bringing an action in either case. The court noted that the plaintiff
did not have standing to bring a private nuisance action inasmuch as
she only had a dower interest in her husband's property. However, it
held that the defendant's action constituted a public nuisance and that
the plaintiff suffered special injury. Therefore, she had the right to
maintain an action based on public nuisance.
Much of the regulatory legislation relating to noise is premised on
noise being a public nuisance. This is especially true of municipal
ordinance.75 The reason appears to be two-fold: (1) It is difficult, ex-
cept in the case of hearing loss due to occupational exposure to noise,
to relate noise levels to serious health effects; (2) While loudness,
duration and frequency of sound are capable of precise measurement,
many of its other characteristics are not susceptible of such measure-
ment. Thus, while state legislation and local ordinances relating to the
regulation of noise contain decibel limitations, most of them also con-
tain provisions relating to noise as a nuisance.
Within constitutional limitations, the legislature has the power to
declare what may constitute a public nuisance, or authorize activity
which, lacking such authorization, would otherwise constitute a public
nuisance.7 6 The legislature may not, however, confer absolute immunity
for conduct constituting a nuisance since such legislative action may
conflict with constitutional inhibitions against the taking of property
for public use without just compensation. Where Congress or a state
legislature has authorized the construction and operation of railway
facilities and conferred upon the railway company the right of eminent
73. 228 Ore. 354, 365 P.2d 72 (1961).
74. The grounds utilized by the court in refusing to grant plaintiff relief were that he
possessed an adequate remedy at law and that he was himself a wrongdoer. Id. at 361, 365
P.2d at 79.
75. 115 CONG. REC. 32178 (1969) (Extension of Remarks by Senator Mark Hatfield enter-
ing into the record material entitled Legal aspects of noise control (1969), by James J.
Kaufman).
76. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 606.
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domain, incidental injury suffered by the public at large is noncom-
pensable if the activity is carried on without negligence.7 7 However,
where the activity would constitute a private nuisance of such a charac-
ter as to substantially deprive a person of the beneficial use of his prop-
erty, he is entitled to compensation for a taking under the fifth or
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.78
It should be noted that this exemption from liability extends only to
that type of annoyance or inconvenience which must be suffered by the
public at large as a consequence of the activity which is legislatively
authorized. The activity is not exempt from liability if it is conducted
negligently or is creating special injury to a party not suffered by the
public generally.79
This rule has been well stated in Richards v. Washington Terminal
Co.:8 0
We deem the true rule, under the 5th Amendment, as under state
constitutions containing a similar prohibition, to be that while
the legislature may legalize what otherwise would be a public nui-
sance, it may not confer immunity from action for a private
nuisance of such a character as to amount in effect to a taking of
private property for public use. 8'
Thus, where the legislature has the power to authorize an activity
that would otherwise be denominated a public nuisance, such legislative
power cannot deprive a person of a property right otherwise guaranteed
by the Constitution. However, even though an activity might be a pub-
lic nuisance if not legislatively authorized, if authorized it would pre-
vent the state from prosecuting a party conducting such activity.8 2
III. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS AT Noise ABATEMENT
A. Introduction
It is perhaps a cliche to note that the problems associated with effec-
tive noise abatement, as with other pressing problems, transcend polit-
ical boundaries and cannot effectively be solved at one governmental
level. Any effective noise abatement problem requires governmental
77. Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914).
78. Id. at 553.
79. Id. at 555.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 553.
82. People v. Brooklyn-Queens Transit Corp., 283 N.Y. 484, 28 N.E.2d 925 (1940).
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cooperation throughout our federal system. Although the effects of
noise are local, effective control of the noise often requires action be-
yond a local level. For example, while there may be local ordinances
directed toward excessive horn-blowing, no local ordinances will be
able to accomplish the desired noise level reduction from aircraft noise.
Santa Barbara, California, adopted an ordinance on September 26,
1967,3 declaring it to be unlawful to pilot any aircraft over or in the
vicinity of the city of Santa Barbara at supersonic speed so as to cause
loud, sudden, and intense sonic boom impacts in the city of Santa Bar-
bara. Apart from whether such an ordinance is constitutional, 4 there is
a real question as to the effectiveness of this type of ordinance in pre-
venting sonic booms from adversely affecting the residents of a munic-
ipality. The prevention of flying at supersonic speed over any well-
populated city would require a federal policy with respect to the use of
navigable airspace by supersonic aircraft.
Existing patterns of governmental regulation demonstrate the types
of responses to the problem of noise and the nature of the legal prob-
lems arising in this context. Therefore, the efforts of local, state, and
federal government will be set forth in that sequence.
B. Noise Abatement on a Local Level
Within the confines of this article it is impossible to analyze all the
local municipal ordinances within the United States pertaining to
noise abatement.8 5 Municipal ordinances relating to noise abatement
take a variety of forms. Some municipalities, such as Chicago,86 have
rather comprehensive noise ordinances that regulate sources and activ-
ities that are noise producing. The main emphasis in the Chicago
ordinance is on vehicular noise abatement, although its provisions
cover stationary sources as well. 7 This ordinance, although of recent
date, does not regulate noise from construction operation. Ordinances
of other municipalities, however, do regulate construction noises. For
83. Santa Barbara, Cal., Ordinance 3246, Sept. 26, 1967.
84. See Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. v. City of Burbank, 318 F. Supp. 914 (C.D. Cal.
1970); American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 272 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
85. See note 75 supra.
86. See Callavari, A New Comprehensive Noise Ordinance, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
PuRDuE NOISE CONTROL CONFERENCE 263 (M. Crocker ed. 1971).
87. Id.
150
Vol. 11: 133, 1972
Noise and the Law
example, an Anchorage, Alaska, ordinance prohibits the use of pile
drivers, power shovels, pneumatic hammers, and other such equipment
in the conduct of building operations between specified hours.
8
Municipal ordinances regulating noise vary in sophistication. Some
rely wholly upon nuisance concepts, while others contain decibel limits.
Ordinances containing decibel limitations take a variety of forms.
Apart from general noise abatement ordinances, zoning ordinances,
building codes, and ordinances regulating vehicular noises may also
contain specific limitations.
Some municipalities regulate noise through a variety of different
ordinances relating to different sources and activities producing noise.
This type of approach to noise control seems more indicative of early
efforts to control noise.8 9 More modern ordinances tend to be of a
comprehensive character with separate sections devoted to different
categories of sources and activities.
A significant number of ordinances regulate the use of sound trucks
and sound amplification devices in public places. These ordinances have
been subject to a substantial amount of litigation in both federal and
state courts.90 The ordinances raise questions concerning abridgments
of the right of freedom of speech guaranteed under the first amendment
of the United States Constitution. The United States Supreme Court
has twice had occasion to rule on the constitutionality of sound truck
ordinances. In Saia v. New York,91 the Court at the instance of a minis-
ter of the Jehovah's Witnesses, struck down as unconstitutional an
ordinance of the city of Lockport, New York, that required prior
permission from the city's chief of police in order to use a sound am-
plification device in a public place. Appellant was convicted under the
ordinance for using such a device in a public place without the requisite
permission. The Court held that the ordinance was unconstitutional in
that it constituted a prior restraint on the right of free speech as guar-
anteed under the first amendment of the Federal Constitution. The
88. See note 75 supra.
89. PITT. DIGEST 724-27 (1936).
90. Rovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Phillips
v. Borough of Folcroft, 305 F. Supp. 766 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Wollam v. City of Palm Springs
59 Cal. 2d 276,379 P.2d 481, 29 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1963); Brinkman v. City of Grinsville, 83 Ga.
App. 508, 64 S.E.2d 344 (1951); Matthes v. Collyer, 32 Misc. 2d 224, 223 N.Y.S.2d 280 (Sup.
Ct. 1961); Commonwealth v. Geuss, 168 Pa. Super. 22, 76 A.2d 500 (1950). For a review of
these cases, see A. GORDON, C. HARTELIUS & S. LEWIN, LAW AND MUNICIPAL ECOLOGY: AIR,
WATER, NOISE, OVERPOPULATION 63-67 (1970).
91. 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
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lack of any standard controlling the discretion of the chief of police in
granting or denying permits was the basis for the Court's decision.
In Kovacs v. Cooper,92 the Supreme Court upheld an ordinance of
Trenton, New Jersey, forbidding the use or operation on the public
streets of sound trucks or instruments attached to a vehicle which
emitted "loud and raucous noises." The Court has subsequently relied
on Kovacs as a recognition of the power of the state to protect, within
constitutional limitation, the well-being and tranquility of a com-
munity,9 3 and to prohibit the making of artificially amplified raucous
sounds in public places."
In Complaint of Antonelli,95 the Quarter Session Court of Allegheny
County, Pennsylvania, held invalid a borough ordinance that prohib-
ited the use of sound trucks and amplifying devices within the Borough
of McKees Rocks. The court reviewed the various cases in which the
issue of the constitutional validity of sound truck ordinances were dis-
cussed. On reviewing the previously litigated cases in this area, the
Allegheny County court concluded that while sound trucks could be
excluded from public streets, they could not constitutionally be barred
from all places within the borough.96 In the course of its opinion the
court made the following observation concerning freedom of speech
and nuisance:
Freedom of speech and nuisance are not mutually exclusive con-
cepts. The right of privacy, so drastically reduced in today's mod-
em cities, is a right fast becoming extinct. Surely a balance between
the conflicting rights of an individual to freely express his views
and the right of another individual to enjoy freedom from dis-
traction can be reached without turning the average city dweller
into a "captive audience." 97
Where local ordinances regulating noise are used to stifle political
opposition, such misuse of official power will be enjoined by the courts.
In Phillips v. Borough of Folcroft,98 the district court issued a prelim-
inary injunction against the enforcement of a local ordinance that was
being used to prohibit the use of sound trucks in an election campaign.
In Phillips the ordinance involved was a disorderly conduct ordinance
92. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
93. Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
94. Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
95. 113 Pitt. L.J. 13 (Pa. C.P. 1964).
96. Id. at 20-21.
97. Id. at 20.
98. 305 F. Supp. 766 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
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that, inter alia, prohibited loud and/or unnecessary noises. The court
found that this ordinance was void for vagueness when applied to sound
trucks being used for political purposes. Whether, outside the free
speech area, the term "unnecessary noise" has the same constitutional
infirmity as in Phillips is open to serious question.99
C. State Noise Abatement Legislation
Most state legislation explicitly directed toward noise abatement
concerns noise made by motor vehicles.1°° Typical legislation in this field
concerns the requirement that mufflers on motor vehicles be in good
repair so as to prevent excessive or unusual noise.1' 1 For example, New
York and California make it unlawful for vehicular noise to exceed a
given decibel limit. 0 2 The use of terms in the legislation such as "un-
usual or excessive noise" has encouraged some defendants to attack the
validity of these laws as being too vague and indefinite to be constitu-
tional. Uniformly, such claims have been unsuccessful. 10 3 The court
in Department of Public Safety v. Buck,10 4 stated the prevailing view
on this question as follows:
Every motor vehicle when in normal operation necessarily makes
some noise, emits some smoke, and permits gas or steam to escape
to some extent. They are in constant operation on our streets and
highways and even in sparsely settled areas of our state. They are
operated daily within the hearing and view of the citizens. We
think any ordinary and interested person would have no difficulty
in determining whether or not an excessive and unusual noise or
offensive or excessive exhaust fumes accompany the operation of a
motor vehicle.'0 5
Some of these laws have unique provisions. Subsection (d) of section
828 of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code' 0 provides:
No violation charged under this section for causing excessive
noise shall be proved except by the testimony of at least two (2)
99. See Connecticut v. Schuster's Express, Inc., 6 Conn. Supp. 108 (Cir. Ct. 1970).
100. Illustrative legislation of this type is set forth in Hildebrand, Noise Pollution: An
Introduction to the Problem and an Outline for Future Legal Research, 70 COLUM. L. Rav.
652 (1970).
101. See note 75 supra.
102. CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 23130 (West 1971): N.Y. VEH. & TRA. LAW § 386 (McKinney
Supp. 1968-69).
103. See Connecticut v. Schuster's Express, Inc., 6 Conn. Supp. 108 (Cir. Ct. 1970).
104. 256 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
105. Id. at 646.
106. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 828 (1971). o
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peace officers who were on the scene of the alleged violation, each
testifying that in his opinion the noise caused was excessive and
each describing such excessive noise.
Subsection (a) of this section relates to unusual, as well as excessive,
noise. 10 7 The language of subsection (d) would not appear to apply to
the causing of unusual, rather than excessive noise. Subsection (d) is
interesting from several points of view:
(1) No state or local police official in Pennsylvania traveling alone
on the highway could ever initiate a successful prosecution for
violation of this section for causing excessive noise.
(2) Assume that a person is charged under this section for causing
excessive noise and that two peace officers were on the scene of
the alleged violation. Would it be a defense to the charge that
either of the two policemen, or both, were hypersensitive to
noise?
(3) Does this provision meet the constitutional requirements of
definiteness for criminal laws?
Although this provision may be difficult, if not impossible, to enforce,
it is illustrative of the difficulties that may arise if sound or odor panels
become a recognized part of noise and odor abatement legislation. It
would have been far better to have provided that excessive noise was
noise above a certain decibel level. Pennsylvania has recently enacted
legislation placing quantitative noise limits on motor vehicles travel-
ing Pennsylvania highways. 08
Section 23130 of the California Vehicle Code'09 establishes decibel
limits for motor vehicles traveling California highways. Subsection (e)
of that section provides:
No person shall have a cause of action relating to the provisions
of this section against a manufacturer of a vehicle or a component
part thereof on a theory based upon breach of express or implied
warranty unless it is alleged and proved that such manufacturer
did not comply with noise limit standards of the Vehicle Code
107. § 828(a) reads as follows:
No person shall operate a motor vehicle except fire department and fire patrol ap-
paratus, on a highway unless such motor vehicle is equipped with an exhaust system,
in good working order and in constant operation, to prevent excessive or unusual
noise.
Id.
108. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 828.2 (Supp. 1972).
0 109. CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 23130 (West 1971).
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applicable to manufacturers and in effect at the time such vehicle
or component part was first sold for purposes other than resale." 0
Apart from the question of the desirability of such a provision, a
question arises concerning its constitutionality. Section 10 of article 1
of the United States Constitution provides that no state may, inter alia,
pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts."' Does the California
provision, above quoted, offend this federal constitutional provision
with respect to express warranties in effect at the time of its enactment?
Apart from state legislation relating to vehicular noise, other laws
may be invoked in an effort to abate noise. Public nuisance statutes may
be invoked as an instrument of noise abatement." 2 Moreover, statutes
relating to disorderly conduct have sometimes been pressed into ser-
vice. 13 With few exceptions, state legislation regulating noise relates to
vehicular noise and mufflers. The regulation of most other sources of
noise has been left to local political subdivisions.
D. Federal Noise Legislation
Federal activity in the field of noise abatement is authorized by the
following categories of congressional legislation:
1. Occupational health and safety legislation;
2. Laws authorizing federal grants or other federal funds in the fields
of airport construction, highways, and housing;
3. Aircraft regulation; and
4. Environmental impact legislation.
Occupational Health and Safety Legislation
The federal government, under a variety of authorizing legislation,
has entered the occupational health and safety field. Congress in the past
has regulated occupational health and safety matters under the Walsh-
110. Id.
111. U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 10.
112. Recently, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania brought a criminal action against a
manufacturer who was creating "excessive noise" in the operation of his business thereby
provoking much complaint in the community. The action was brought under PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 4612 (1963), which makes it a misdemeanor to maintain a public nuisance.
The defendant in the case chose not to contest the matter. Although the case was not
litigated, it represented an effort on the part of the commonwealth to utilize the public
nuisance provisions of the Penal Code in the field of noise abatement. To the authors'
knowledge, this is the first time a case of this sort has been brought in Pennsylvania. Com-
monwealth v. Atlas Alloys, Inc., Crim. No. 93 (Wash. Co., Pa. Magis. Ct., filed Oct. 29, 1970).
113. Disorderly conduct statutes generally have provisions that relate to loud, boisterous,
and unseemly noise. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4406 (1963).
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Healey Act," 4 the Service Contract Act of 1965,"15 and the National
Foundation on Arts and Humanities Act. 1 6 More recently Congress has
enacted the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970,117 and the
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act.118
Under the provisions of the Walsh-Healey Act, the Department of
Labor adopted rules and regulations for employees working in establish-
ments covered by that Act. 119 Under these regulations, the Secretary
of Labor and Industry established maximum levels of exposure to
occupational noise. 12 0 These same noise exposure levels were adopted
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,121 that covers
establishments affecting interstate commerce. 22 The Secretary of the
Interior has adopted rules and regulations with respect to noise levels
in mines under the authority of the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act. 123
Both the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970 and the Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act have much more effective sanctions for
those employers who violate the rules and regulations of either depart-
ment than does the Walsh-Healey Act. 124 Additionally, the administra-
tion of these latter Acts has greater enforcement possibilities than does
the Walsh-Healey Act. There are provisions in both the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 and the Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act for inspectors with substantial powers to enter premises and make
realistic inspections. 25 Under the Walsh-Healey Act little inspectional
114. 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1970).
115. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-12 (1970).
116. 20 U.S.C. §§ 951-63 (1970).
117. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970).
118. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960 (1970).
119. 41 C.F.R. §§ 50-204.1-.75 (1972).
120. 41 C.F.R. § 50-204.10 (1972).
121. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.95 (1972).
122. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 § 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 652(3) (1970),
defines "commerce" as "trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among
the several States, or between a State and any place outside thereof, or within the District
of Columbia, or a possession of the United States (other than the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands), or between points in the same State but through a point outside thereof."
123. 30 C.F.R. §§ 71.300-.301 (1972).
124. See § 17 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1970),
and § 109 of the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 3 U.S.C. § 819 (1970), both of which
provide for substantial penalties. § 2 of the Walsh-Healey Act, 41 U.S.C. § 36 (1970), pro-
vides for contract cancellation and damages in the case of a breach of contract by the
contractor. That Act has no penal provisions.
125. § 8 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 657 (1970),
confers upon the Secretary of Labor comprehensive inspectional authority. Likewise, § 103
of the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. § 813 (1970), confers on the Secretary
of the Interior expansive investigatory powers for the enforcement of his responsibilities
under that Act.
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activity was conducted. Moreover, its sanctions were merely a cancella-
tion of the contract and a suit for the breach. 126
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 encourages state
plans which are compatible with the provisions of the Act.127 Thus,
there is a distinct possibility of increasing enforcement personnel by
having compatible state plans, and thereby providing the clear possi-
bility that industrial noise levels will be regulated in a more effective
manner than in the past. However, there are those who argue that the
noise levels under the Walsh-Healey Act, the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, and the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act are not
sufficient to protect employees from the adverse effects of occupational
noise.128
Laws Authorizing Federal Grants
Federal acts that authorize noise to be taken into effect in the making
of grants and the utilization of other types of federal funding are the
Aviation Act, 129 the Federal Aid Highways Act, 10 and the National
Housing Act.131 Under the Aviation Act, national airport facilities
and state or local airport facilities that are built with federal funds
must take into consideration environmental matters.132 Although the
term "environmental matters" is not specific with respect to noise,
the term does embrace considerations of noise. 33 Under the Federal
Aid Highways Act, state highways built with federal funds must take
into consideration the environmental impact of the highways. 134 The
Department of Transportation has specific duties under that Act135 to
implement its provisions relating to hearings that must be held by the
states that wish to avail themselves of the benefits of the Federal Aid
126. Walsh-Healey Act § 2, 41 U.S.C. § 36 (1970).
127. Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970 § 18, 29 U.S.C. § 667 (1970).
128. There is substantial opinion to the effect that the noise standards in the federal
regulations are designed to protect employees from occupational hearing loss, not hearing
loss in general. Some who have studied the problem are of the opinion that the federal
regulations should be more stringent than they are at present in order to protect the em-
ployees exposed to noise in an occupational environment from the "loss of the human re-
source of hearing." Professor Kenneth Steward of the Graduate School of Public Health,
University of Pittsburgh, is one expert in the noise control field who has advanced this
position.
129. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-542 (1970).
130. 23 U.S.C. §§ 101-44 (1970).
131. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-50g (1970).
132. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1712(d), 1716(d) (1970).
133. Id.




Highways Act. 136 The Department of Housing and Urban Development
has adopted standards for housing and other facilities which serve as
collateral or security for loans guaranteed by the federal government. 187
Aircraft Regulation
The Aviation Act' 88 has provisions relating to aircraft noise and
sonic boom.18 9 Under the provisions of section 611 of the Act, enacted
July 21, 1968, the Federal Aviation Administrator, after consultation
with the Secretary of Transportation, is given the authority to prescribe
and amend standards for the measurement of aircraft noise and sonic
boom. He is also required to prescribe and amend such rules and reg-
ulations as he may find necessary for the control and abatement of air-
craft noises and sonic boom including the application of such standards,
rules, and regulations in the issuance, amendment, modification, sus-
pension, or revocation of any certificate authorized by the Act.14 0
Under these provisions of the Aviation Act, if the application of the
noise abatement standards has the effect of amending, modifying, or sus-
pending a particular certificate granted under the Act, the holder of
such certificate has the opportunity to question the propriety of apply-
ing these standards to him by requesting a hearing before the admin-
istrator.' 4' If the holder is not satisfied with the action of the adminis-
trator, he may take an appeal to the National Transportation Board 42
that stays the action of the administrator unless there is an emerg-
ency.143 This action is stayed pending decision on appeal by the
Board. 44 The Board may amend, modify, or reverse the action of the
administrator if it finds either:
(a) that the application of the standards to the particular cer-
tificate holder are not required for the control or abatement of
aircraft noise or sonic boom, and the public interest does not re-
quire such a decision, or
(b) that the decision is inconsistent with safety in air commerce
or transportation. 45
136. Id.
137. For example, the Department of Housing and Urban Development has standards
with respect to multi-family dwellings, homes for aged, and nursing homes.
138. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-542 (1970).
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Environmental Impact Legislation
Clearly, the most extensive and far-reaching federal legislation hav-
ing to do with environmental matters is the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1970,146 usually referred to as NEPA. Under this Act, all
major federal action which has an impact upon the human environ-
ment is required to be accompanied by an environmental impact state-
ment which must be drafted before the action is taken.147 Federal
agencies are required by the Act to follow certain procedural steps to
assure that the environmental consequences of their proposed action
are thoroughly explored with a view toward minimizing adverse envi-
ronmental impacts. 48 NEPA has already been the subject of substan-
tial litigation.149 NEPA buttresses environmental impact provisions of
other federal laws such as the Aviation Act, and the Federal Aid High-
ways Act. Inasmuch as noise is a serious environmental factor, environ-
mental impact statements must consider the problem of noise where
appropriate. While NEPA specifically does not direct a given resolu-
tion of federal activity, it does mandate that serious consideration be
given to the environmental impact of major federal actions. 50
While it is too early to determine the exact impact of NEPA, the
federal judiciary has refused to consign it to oblivion.' 51 The federal
courts have required that federal agencies comply with the procedural
aspects of the law before embarking upon projects or actions that must
be evaluated under the Act in terms of their environmental impact. 52
In addition to NEPA, Congress recently enacted the Noise Pollution
and Abatement Act of 1970.158 Under this Act there is established
within the Environmental Protection Agency an Office of Noise Abate-
ment and Control charged with the full and complete investigation of
the effects of noise on public health and welfare. The purpose of such
study and investigation is to identify and classify causes and sources of
noise and to determine the following:
146. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 4352 (1970).
148. See Calvert Cliff's Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
149. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971);
Port of N.Y. Authority v. United States, 451 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1971); Calvert Cliff's
Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); West Virginia Highland
Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1971); Zabel v. Tabb, 438
F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 320 F. Supp.
878 (D.D.C. 1971).
150. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
151. Id.
152. National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971).
153. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1858-(a) (1970).
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1. the effect of noise at various levels,
2. projected growth of noise levels in urban areas through the year
2000,
3. the psychological and physiological effect of noise on humans,
4. the effect of sporadic, extreme noises (such as jet noise near an
airport) as compared with constant noise,
5. the effect on wildlife and property (including property values),
6. the effect of sonic booms on property (including property
values), and
7. such other matters as may be of interest in the public wel-
fare.154
This legislation, which is Title IV of the Clean Air Act, 55 also re-
quires that, where any federal department or agency is carrying out
or sponsoring any activity resulting in noise which the administrator
determines amounts to a public nuisance or is otherwise objectionable,
such department or agency shall consult with the administrator to
determine possible means of abating such noise.
If one compares the progress of federal air pollution control legisla-
tion with the recently enacted Noise Pollution and Abatement Act of
1970,156 one is impressed with the similarity of approach. As in the
air pollution control field, Congress has first mandated that a federal
study on the noise problem be made to determine the effect on public
health and welfare. Congressional regulatory activity in the air pollu-
tion field followed federal studies of the effects of air pollution, so there
is the great expectation that the federal government will also obtain
regulatory authority over the problems of noise. 157 The only difference
between air pollution control and noise abatement is that the federal
activity in the noise abatement field will probably follow more closely
upon the Noise Pollution and Abatement Act of 1970158 than did the
air pollution control legislation follow upon the studies of air pollution
by the federal government. 59 Currently, the Office of Noise Abatement
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. The first congressional act relating to air pollution was enacted in 1955. Act of
July 14, 1955, ch. 360, §§ 1-6, 69 Stat. 322. Throughout the fifteen subsequent years ending
with the most recent amendments to the Federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-e (1970).
Congress has progressively strengthened federal involvement in this field. The initial
federal legislation, relating to the conduct of research programs and to federal-state co-
operation in the field of air pollution control relating to noise, emphasized research
into problems of noise.
157. See, e.g., S. 3324, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 11021, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
158. In all probability, Congress will enact one of the noise control bills currently
before it in the near future.
159. As noted above, see note 155 supra, the first federal act relating to air pollution
was enacted in 1955. This contained no enforcement provisions. It was not until 1963 that
160
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and Control in the Environmental Protection Agency has a legislative
proposal for federal control over certain noise-making equipment, ap-
pliances, and devices. 160
IV. CONCLUSION
As indicated in the foregoing, the legal problems associated with
noise may, like other environmental problems, be analyzed in terms
of private remedies and public regulation. This, however, is not to
suggest that these two divisions of the problem are mutually exclusive.
Governmental intervention in the field of noise abatement which
makes use of some of the same legal mechanisms that are available to
the private individual in asserting his rights is merely an obvious
example of this inter-relationship. On a more subtle level, the noise
problems associated with aircraft have resulted in a mixture of private
and public remedies-clearly showing that the problems cannot be
separated into such airtight compartments. Nevertheless, it has been
useful to delineate the area of private remedies from the area of public
intervention for purely analytical purposes.
In the field of private nuisance, the types of problems that have
arisen can be categorized as follows:
1. The making of noise for the deliberate purpose of offending
others. It is no triumph of legal reasoning that such noise-making
has been universally the subject of legal liability.
2. Noise-making that is a concommitant of business or industrial
activity. That the type of activity which gives rise to the problem
of noise in cases of this sort may lead to differing results in differ-
ing jurisdictions is indicative of the competing values that arise
in adjusting private rights of this nature. Kramon has shown that
the law of nuisance is an imperfect legal instrument in the field
of noise abatement.' 6 . While this may be the case, nuisance law
cannot be completely disregarded. It does provide a remedy in
many instances. That it does not provide a panacea is no reason
to deny its usefulness.
some enforcement provision was embodied in federal air pollution control legislation. For
a history of this legislation through 1967, see United States v. Bishop Processing Co., 287
F. Supp. 624 (D. Md. 1968), afl'd, 423 F.2d 469 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970);
Bishop Processing Co. v. Gardner, 275 F. Supp. 780 (D. Md. 1967).
160. H.R. 11021, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
161. Kramon, Noise Control: Traditional Remedies and a Proposal for Federal Action,
7 HARV. J. LEGIS. 533, 538-44 (1970).
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3. The problem of vehicular and aircraft noise as it impinges
upon the remedies otherwise available in the nuisance area. In
both cases, the problem is posed in terms of strongly sanctioned
policy in favor of the promotion and development of air and
vehicular travel as opposed to the detrimental effects in terms of
noise, as well as other detrimental characteristics, that are suf-
fered by individuals and the general public. The strongly articu-
lated policies in favor of air transportation, for example, have
precluded the use of the injunction as a viable means of curtail-
ing the nuisance due to aircraft. 16 2 Rather, private remedies have
been exclusively compensatory in nature. In addition, there have
been legislative efforts to minimize the impact of aircraft and
vehicular noise. However, with regard to aircraft noise, safety
considerations take preference where noise abatement procedures
might conflict with the needs of air safety.16 3
Except where the federal government requires measures to abate
and reduce aircraft noise, there is no other legal remedy realistically
available which would compel aircraft noise reduction. The alterna-
tive remedy, damages for the taking of property, merely allows for
the purchase of rights to make noise over a greater area, rather than
directly requiring noise reduction.
State and local noise control laws, for the most part, have been poorly
enforced. The failure of effective noise control legislation on a state
and local level has led to demands for federal legislation that will ulti-
mately occupy much of the field of noise regulation. The most promis-
ing types of federal response are the proposals emanating from the
Environmental Protection Agency and some representatives in Con-
gress. If viable noise control standards can be adopted for products in
interstate commerce including motor vehicles, effective enforcement of
such laws has the possibility of reducing substantially the noise emit-
ting potential of such products.
The environmental impact legislation on the federal level will lead
to more concern with problems of noise. Inasmuch as NEPA does not
authoritively sanction particular choices, however, this environmental
impact legislation can affect noise levels only if federal agencies seri-
ously take into consideration the basic purpose of NEPA.
162. See pp. 140-41 supra.
163. See note 145 supra.
162
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Although nuisance law has been the mainstay of much state and
local legislation regulating noise, it is important that decibel levels be
specified in noise statutes and ordinances. Not only will this help to
make standards more definite; but it will reduce the evidentiary prob-
lem of determining whether the elements of nuisance exist. Moreover,
as decibel limits become feasible as a viable tool in noise abatement,
there will be less need to resort to nuisance law. Nuisance law will then
become a residual category to be used when it is impossible to quantify
responses to noise. Such a development would tend to bring more
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